This papers studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potential games. Action revision, link creation and link destruction are combined in a continuous-time Markov process. I derive the unique invariant distribution of this process in closed form, as well as the marginal distribution over action profiles and the conditional distribution over networks. It is shown that the equilibrium interaction topology is an inhomogeneous random graph. Furthermore, a characterization of the set of stochastically stable states is provided, generalizing existing results to models with endogenous interaction structures.
Introduction
The analysis of social networks has recently gained interest in various fields in the sciences and social sciences. By now there is a rich literature on social networks in economics; the textbooks by Jackson (2008) and Vega-Redondo (2007) give a concise overview on this emerging field. Recently, tools from evolutionary game theory have been used to study the co-evolution of networks and play. Models in this vein are Jackson and Watts (2002) , Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) , and Hojman and Szeidl (2006) . Another type of model, which is more in the tradition of statistical physics, puts more weight on modelling the evolution of the network, without paying too much attention to the role of strategic interactions. Prominent examples are Ehrhardt et al. (2006; 2008a; . This paper aims to combine these two streams of literature in a very simplistic model. I present a stochastic co-evolutionary model which includes three sub-processes: action adjustment, link creation, or link destruction. These three sub-processes are combined into one continuous-time Markov process called a co-evolutionary model with noise. For positive noise levels the process is ergodic. For the class of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) many fundamental characteristics of the system are explicitly computable. Key to all the results in this paper is the closed-form expression of the invariant distribution. This probability distribution describes the long-run behavior of the system in two complementary ways. First, it gives us complete information on the joint probability distribution over action profiles and networks which governs the "equilibrium" of the stochastic dynamics. Second, by virtue of ergodicity, it gives us complete information which states are more frequently observed over time compared to others. From the invariant distribution one can deduce the conditional probability distribution over networks for a fixed profile of actions. In the parlance of random graph theory this gives us the ensemble of random graphs. The interesting result is that the model generates so-called inhomogeneous random graphs. Inhomogeneous random graphs are a straightforward extension of the classical random graph model proposed by Erdös and Rényi (1960) , where the probability with which two vertices are linked depend in some way on the characteristics of the vertices. Söderberg (2002) and Bollobás et al. (2007) are models in this direction. These papers fix the edge success probability at the outset. On the contrary, in the present model the edge success probability is derived from the long-run equilibrium of the system, hence is explained endogenously. To the best of my knowledge, this is a new result, which opens the way to interesting linkages between evolutionary game theory and the theory of random graph dynamics. This relationship is further explored in the companion article Staudigl (2009b) .
Next, I provide an expression for the marginal distribution over action profiles in the population. This measure is interesting if one is not interested in the effects of the interaction structure. Finally, we explore the well-known relationship between potential maximizers and stochastic stability (for early work in this direction see for instance Blume, 1993 , Young, 1998 . A fairly general argument is provided, showing that as noise vanishes the invariant distribution concentrates on the set of potential maximizers. At first sight, this might not be a too surprising result. However, former models were only concerned with fixed interaction structures, so the conclusion of our theorem extends the previous ones.
Moreover, the argument presented in this paper is much more general than the proofs in the just mentioned literature. This technique allows to study the low-noise behavior of the invariant distribution also in more complicated models, as for instance Staudigl (2009a) . Since the class of potential games is rather narrow, I also sketch briefly how the results obtained extend if the potential game assumption is dropped. In Staudigl (2009b) a rather general class of co-evolutionary dynamics is presented, and I refer to this paper for further details. However, many games arising in economic applications have this special structure. The most prominent class of potential games are congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973) . They also arise in Cournot oligopoly models with linear inverse demand functions (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . Recently, Sandholm (2007) studies a mechanism design problem where the planner can construct a pricing scheme, so that the transformed game is a potential game, which leads, in his model, to the long-run selection of socially efficient outcomes. Ui (2000) has shown interesting interconnections between the Shapley value and potential functions, and Morris and Ui (2005) use potential methods to study equilibria which are robust to incomplete information.
Closest to the present work is a recent paper by Ehrhardt et al. (2008b) , who study a similar dynamic process. Their link formation mechanism is designed in such a way that only players who play the same action form a link. This is interpreted as a pure homophily based linking process.
They also characterize the induced ensemble of random graphs, and find that the network consists of disjoint components, each following the distribution of an Erdös-Rényi ensemble. This paper extends their result by allowing for much more general behavioral rules, both in the action adjustment and the link creation process, which results in a richer interaction structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model framework is explained in detail. In sections 3 and 4, I derive the asymptotic characteristics of the model. Sections 5 and 6 present an analysis of the joint distribution of action profiles and social networks as well as the induced marginal distributions. Section 7 characterizes stochastically stable states. Section 8 sketches a general class of stochastic processes on the co-evolution of networks and play. A, found at the end of the paper, collects lengthy and technical proofs.
The model
Consider a finite population of individuals i, j, k ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , N}, members of which are called players or agents. Each player can choose one out of q different pure actions from the set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a q }. I will also say "playing action r" with the understanding that this is action a r . An action profile (configuration) is a tuple α = (α i ) i∈I ∈ A I . When individual i meets individual j, they engage in a 2-player game defined by the payoff function u : A 2 → R. We assume that this function is symmetric in the following sense:
Games with this special property are known as (exact) potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . This defines the base game Γ b := (A, u).
The interaction structure is modeled as an undirected graph (network).
Let I (2) denote the set of unordered pairs of players. There are N(N − 1)/2 such pairs. A graph is a pair G = (I, E ), where we interpret I as the set of vertices (nodes) and E = E (G) ⊆ I (2) the set of edges (links). An edge is an unordered pair of players (i, j) ≡ (j, i) with the interpretation that if (i, j) ∈ E, then players i and j play against each other. If E = I (2)
we obtain the complete graph on I, denoted by G c . In this graph each individual is connected to everybody else and we obtain the standard global matching model. If E = ∅ then we speak of the empty graph G e . A graph G = (I , E ) is a subgraph of G = (I, E ) if I ⊆ I and E ⊆ E . For two disjoint subsets of players V, V ⊂ I denote the set of edges that join players from V with players belonging to V (and vice-versa) as E (V, V ).
All graphs on I differ only in terms of their edge set E . Let G[I] denote the set of graphs that can be formed on the vertex set I. It is often more convenient to work with networks via the function g :
If g i j (G) = 1 then players i and j are linked under the graph G and play against each other. Thus, we have the iden-
. In view of this equivalence, we will identify the space G[I] ≡ G as the set of all possible edge realizations {0, 1} I (2) , members of which are vectors g = (g i j ) 1≤i≤j≤N . The number of edges of the graph g is e(g)
A population state is the pair ω = (α, g) ∈ Ω ≡ A I × G. It contains an action profile and a network. Let α
denote the network that we obtain if the (previously nonexisting) edge connecting players i and j is created, and g (i, j) be the network resulting from the deletion of the edge connecting players i and j.
Given a population state ω, define for every player i ∈ I the (open) interaction neighborhood
The set N i ∪ {i} ≡N i defines the closed interaction neighborhood of a player. There are κ i r (ω) := |{j ∈ I|g i j = 1 & α j = a r }| r-players against which player i has to play. The total number of games in which player i is involved is given by his degree κ i (ω) = ∑ q r=1 κ i r (ω). From all these interactions, player i receives the total payoff
In analogy with standard population games, I will call the collection of payoff functions π = (π i ) i∈I the structured population game.
3 Co-evolution with noise
Consider the family of perturbed Markov processes
where Ω is the finite state space of pairs ω = (α, g), F a suitably chosen σ-algebra (e.g. 2 Ω ), P : F → [0, 1] a probability measure, and (Y β (t)) t≥0 a family of Ω-valued random variables indexed by a noise parameter β ≥ 0 and a continuous time parameter t. M β will define a co-evolutionary model with noise. The time evolution of this process can be studied by its infinitesimal generator. Define the operator
whose components are mappings η β : Ω × Ω → R satisfying 0 ≤ η β (ω → ω) < ∞ for allω = ω, and ∑ω η β (ω →ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. The value η β (ω →ω) is interpreted as the rate with which the process moves from state ω to some other stateω. 1 The generator is defined by the following sub-processes.
Action update:
The way how players update their actions is modeled as in Blume (2003) or Hofbauer and Sandholm (2007) . Players are endowed with independent Poisson alarm clocks, ringing at the common rate ν > 0. The total rate of this subprocess is thus Nν. Conditional on the event of a revision opportunity, player i receives the chance to adjust his action with probability 1/N. When player i gets a revision opportunity he calculates the current expected payoff of all of his pure actions, given the set of neighbors, but his computations are perturbed by some random shock ε i = (ε i a ) a∈A . Assume that these perturbations are i.i.d. type 1 extreme value distributed, 2 and that i selects action a r ∈ A with probability
Computing this probability explicitly leads to
1 In a very small time interval [t, t + h), the probability that the process moves from ω toω is then approximately η β (ω →ω)h. 2 This formulation of stochastically perturbed payoffs has a very long tradition in the theory of discrete choice, see e.g. Anderson et al. (1992) . For a more recent treatise and alternative interpretation see van Damme and Weibull (2002) . The cumulative distribution function of a doubly exponential distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance
Beside its importance in theoretical economics, it has also been used in experimental studies, see for instance McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) , where it is known as the "quantal response function". Assumption 2. The rate functions of individuals take the form
This formulation reflects the intuitive idea that players, who expect a large profit from interactions with currently unknown players, should be relatively fast in creating their network. Let
so that the conditional probability that player i receives a link creation opportunity is simply λ i,β (ω)/λ β (ω). Conditional on this event, player i screens the set of unknown players (i.e. those player who are not neighbors yet) and picks one player from this set who yields the highest per-interaction payoff, perturbed by a noisy signal
. Hence, the conditional probability that i selects j for a linking partner is
If we assume that the random perturbation follows the same distributional law as in the action adjustment process one obtains the logit formula
For general link creation probabilities (3.5), the rate of transiting
Using Assumption 2 and (3.6) gives us
Link destruction: To make the dynamic interesting, we need a process that counteracts the creation of links. Following recent papers by Ehrhardt et al. (2006; 2008b) , I assume that there exists an exogenous random shock removing any of these links. This unguided drift term models the phenomenon of environmental volatility, and is a key ingredient of the model. It captures the idea that connections are not everlasting, but as time goes by and players change their behavior, the profitability of links will also change, making some connections obsolete. The rate at which the link (i, j) disappears is given by ξ > 0. 3 Hence, in a very small time interval [t, t + h) the probability of survival of a currently existing edge (i, j) is ξh + o(h). The expected life time of an edge is 1/ξ. Hence, starting from ω = (α, g), the
The last case we have to consider is a "phantom switch", i.e. the transition rate η β (ω → ω). Define the rate of such an event as
where
To summarize, the infinitesimal generator of the co-evolutionary model with noise M β is defined as
It is easily verified that 
The invariant distribution
By ergodicity, the co-evolutionary model with noise admits a unique invariant distribution µ (β,ξ) = (µ (β,ξ) (ω)) ω∈Ω . In terms of the generator η β , this probability distribution satisfies the global balance equation
Determining this probability vector is facilitated in the special class of reversible Markov processes. Given the model M β with generator η β , we can define for a given T > 0 its time reversal as the process
said to be reversible, if its time reversal has the same distribution as the original process (see Stroock, 2005, ch. 5) . In our case, reversibility will appear as an equilibrium phenomenon (i.e. (Y(t) β ) t≥0 is reversible in equilibrium). The detailed balance condition, relative to the infinitesimal gener-ator η β , gives a sufficient condition for µ (β,ξ) being an invariant distribution. The measure µ (β,ξ) is in detailed balance with the generator η β if
A probability distribution satisfying the detailed balance condition (4.1) must be an invariant distribution. Conversely, a probability distribution satisfying condition (4.1) implies reversibility of the corresponding Markov process.
Theorem 4.1. Given (β, ξ) (0, 0), the unique invariant distribution of the co-evolutionary model with noise M β equals
j is the the partition function.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A consequence of ergodicity is the convergence of long-run averages of sample paths to the invariant distribution. Formally, this means
where 1 A is the indicator function of a measurable set A ⊆ Ω, and for
is the expected value of the function f under the invariant distribution µ (β,ξ) .
Observe that for β > 0 µ (β,ξ) is a full support distribution on Ω. Thus, the only thing one may be able to deduce from it is to classify a subset of states which receive more mass than others. The subsequent chapters are devoted to this exercise.
Define an aggregate utility index as the sum of individual utilities,
Efficiency, in terms of this index, is a state in the argmax set of (4.3).
Lemma 4.1 shows that one can construct from eq. (4.3) a real-valued function, which captures the effects of individual utilities due to a single change in the state variable ω. In game theory such a function is known as an exact potential (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) . Since the state variable encompasses the connections among the players, but these are not part of the strategy of a single player, a potential function for π = (π i ) i∈I is not a potential function in its game-theoretic sense. However, it fulfills the same role in the dynamic analysis to come as a conventional potential function in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) , and so we will still call such a function a potential function for the structured population game, having in mind that this does not conform with its established use in game theory.
Lemma 4.1. The structured population game (π i ) i∈I is a potential game with exact potential function
Proof. We have to show that
Let us start with the event of a link creation between players i and j. The destruction of such a link has the same consequences. A direct computation shows that
by symmetry of the payoff function u. Now, concerning a change in action of player i, we now have to take care of the environment of this player.
All players in the set I \N i (ω) are not affected by the change in player i's action. Fix the state ω and suppose player i switches to action a v . The new state is therefore ω a v i , and we can write
Now consider the function H : 5 The ensemble of random graphs
Given ω = (α, g) ∈ Ω, define the set of r-players as I r (ω) := {i ∈ I|α i = a r }. Sets of this form will be called action classes. Every state assigns each player to a single action class. Hence, the family {I r } 1≤r≤q defines a partition on the set I. Fix a partition I ≡ {I r } 1≤r≤q and define the subspace Ω(I ) := {ω ∈ Ω|I r (ω) = I r , 1 ≤ r ≤ q}.
We say that state ω agrees with the action partition I, if it is contained
in Ω(I ). Note that the definition of the set Ω(I ) does not say anything about network structures. Once we condition on an action partition, we fix a strategy configuration α ∈ A I , but allow for all potential networks.
In other words, µ (β,ξ) (ω|I ) ≡ µ (β,ξ) (g|α).
Given a partition I, the product operator ∏ N i=1 ∏ j>i has the same meaning as the product operator ∏ q r=1 ∏ i∈I r (ω) ∏ v≥r ∏ j∈I v (ω);j>i . This implies that we are able to re-formulate the stationary distribution in terms of action classes, so that for all ω ∈ Ω
For proper normalization of this measure one has to compute the total mass received by the set Ω(I ), which is
Let e r|v (ω) := ∑ i∈I r (ω) ∑ j∈I v (ω),j>i g i j , denote the number of edges connecting r-players with v-players at state ω, and define for all (i, j) ∈ I (2)
Given an action partition I, consider the subgraph G r|v := (I r ∪ I v , E r|v ),
are constant, so that we may write p 
where δ x,y = 1 if, and only if, x = y, and 0 otherwise. The main result of this section is then the following result. with edge success probability
Part (a) of the Theorem shows that the equilibrium ensemble of graphs boils down to an inhomogeneous random graph (Söderberg, 2002 , Bollobás et al., 2007 . For an arbitrary action profile eq. (5.3) gives us complete information about the probability with which an r-strategist interacts with players from other action classes. Thus, if one wants to make a probabilistic prediction about the interaction pattern between r-players and v-players, all one has to do is to look at the factor
what is exactly the probability measure of the random graph model of Erdös and Rényi (1960) . Since this the interactions among r and v-players follow a Bernoulli distribution, the expected number of interactions, given the profile α, is determined by the formula
For the covariances we see that
The fact that the total graph can be regarded as a collection of independent Erdös-Rényi graphs (with different edge success probabilities) makes it possible to derive a probability distribution for the degree of a randomly selected individual i ∈ I r . Since κ i = ∑ 
where R (β,ξ) (I ) is the normalizing factor.
Observe that for the degree distribution it suffices to know the number of players in the various action classes, not their identity. Hence, all action partitions I that put the same number of players into the various classes are equivalent in terms of the connectivity structure of the network. Thus, instead of looking at a specific action partition I, it is sufficient to work with less information contained in a tuple n = (n 1 , . . . , n q ) such that n v = |I v | for all v and ∑ We will examine the degree distribution for 1-players under various parameter constellations (β, ξ) for the frequency vector n = (80, 20) . Figure 1 shows the degree distribution for a typical 1-player under the parameter constellation (β, ξ) = (0.5, 70). The mean degree of 1-players is seen to be 78. However, we cannot say to which action class most of this links lead to since we only look at the distribution of the total degree κ. Applying Theorem 5.1, we get complete information about the inter-group connectivity pattern by inspecting the two
Note that p 1|1 → 1 as β → 0, implying that in this limit only links within the same action class exist with probability 1. Consequently, for small noise levels the majority of the 78 neighbors will be 1-players as well. For larger levels of noise (the right figure with β = 1.5) we observe a drastically smaller average degree. This implies that the effect of the parameter values β and ξ goes into the same direction. Increasing β with constant ξ will have qualitatively the same effect as increasing ξ with constant β.
An invariant distribution over action profiles
Having derived a probability distribution on the set of networks, we will now derive a probability distribution on the set of action frequency vectors n = (n 1 , . . . , n q ). Let D := {n ∈ N q | ∑ q r=1 n r = N} denote the set of admissible action frequency vectors and define the correspondence
Proposition 6.1. The invariant distribution over action frequency vectors n ∈ D is given by the mapping ρ (β,ξ) 
Proof. The proof starts from the distribution over action classes I (5.2).
The rest is a simple combinatorial exercise. The population consists of N distinct elements. There are q different boxes over which we want to distribute the N elements, and in each box r = 1, . . . , q there should be n r elements at the end of the day, and all N elements must be in one box, so that ∑ q r=1 n r = N holds. There are N! n 1 !...n q ! different ways of solving this allocation problem. Counting all states ω that agree with a given action class size profile n leads to a probability distribution having the form
Using the respective definitions of the maps ρ (β,ξ) and z (β,ξ) r (n) yields the desired result.
7 Stochastic stability Stochastic game dynamics have become important due to their power concerning equilibrium selection. The concept of stochastic stability, introduced by Foster and Young (1990) , Young (1993) and Kandori et al. (1993) into game theory, gives a selection criterion based on the underlying dynamic process.
The set of stochastically stable states is denoted as Ω * .
It has been shown by Blume (1993; 1997) and Young (1998) that the logit dynamics concentrates on the set of potential maximizers as the noise level goes to zero. However, their results are not directly applicable in the current context, since the graph is itself part of the state variable.
Selection of Potential maximizers
The following Theorem, the proof of which is based on the general discussion in Catoni (1999) , is the main result of this section.
Theorem 7.1. The Gibbs distribution (4.6) concentrates on the set P := arg max ω∈Ω P(ω) as β → 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. This shows that in the limit of vanishingly small noise the process will spend almost all of its time in the vicinity of potential maximizers. In view of the relation between the potential function and aggregate utility, this gives an efficiency result for long run behavior. Furthermore, in view of the ergodic theorem, which has been mentioned briefly in Section 4, we know that long run averages of the potential function converge to the expected value under the invariant distribution µ (β,ξ) . Since this expected value converges to max ω∈Ω P(ω) as β → 0, we get the following corollary.
Almost surely therefore the process arrives at states where social welfare is maximized.
Efficiency in pure coordination games
Consider the class of games with payoff function u(a, a ) := φ(a, a ) − c, that satisfies condition (2.1), as well as
The first condition states that matching the action chosen by the opponent is always a best reply. The second condition imposes an ordering on the payoffs of actions, where a q denotes the payoff dominant action. From the symmetry of the payoff function, eq. (2.1), it follows that there are q strict Nash equilibria in the base game where the two players choose the same action. The constant c ≥ 0 has no strategic effect, and can be interpreted as the costs of a link. 5 To keep notation simple, suppose that all strict Nash equilibria have different payoffs. Let g e = g(G e ), g c = g(G c ) denote the empty and the complete graph, respectively.
Proposition 7.1. Let P : Ω → R be the potential function (4.4), and suppose that the payoff function of the base game G b satisfies eq. (7.2). Then
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the potential function (4.4) can be written as
From this one can immediately see the validity of the claim for the highcost scenario u(a q , a q ) < 0. Now consider the case where u(a q , a q ) = 0. Clearly P(ω) ≤ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, with equality only at the states that are in the set described in the text of the Proposition.
Finally, consider the case u(a q , a q ) > 0. Since this is the largest payoff obtainable from the base game, and the potential function is linear in the links, the claim follows. This is also the unique maximizer of the potential function.
Corollary 7.2. Consider the co-evolutionary model M β , with base game from the class of pure-coordination games (7.2). Then Ω * = P.
A general class of stochastic co-evolutionary dynamics
The model presented so far relied on the assumptions that the base game has an exact potential, and the rate functions of the individual players have the particular form (3.4). These assumptions make the model very tractable, and we were able to deduce many fundamental characteristics of the long-run behavior of the system. On the other hand, one may say that these assumptions are too strict. Let me shortly discuss how the model can be extended to a rather general class of co-evolutionary models with noise. For a detailed discussion I refer to the companion paper Staudigl (2009b) . There a rather general class of of perturbed timehomogeneous Markov chains, similar to M β , is presented, where players may have heterogenous preferences in the base game, but choose from a common action set. 6 A general characterization of the invariant distribution of such models is provided, as well as an algorithm which identifies stochastically stable states, based on tree-constructions in the spirit of Freidlin and Wentzell (1998) . The present model fits into this general framework, and let me just sketch what the long run behavior of this model would be, if one drops Assumptions 1 and 2. Instead of (3.4), assume that the players' rate function equals λ i (ω) = λ1 {κ i (ω)<N−1} , and λ is a positive constant. For sake of illustration suppose the base game is a symmetric 2 × 2 coordination game with one Pareto efficient equilibrium (a 1 , a 1 ), and one risk-dominant equilibrium (a 2 , a 2 ). The specific payoffs are not important. 7 I claim that these small alterations of the model lead to a non-selection result. Any pair of players, which use the same action, may be connected in the long-run equilibrium; putting it differently, as β goes to zero we do not obtain a point prediction as in Section 7, but the limit distribution will (in general) put positive weight on a proper subset of Ω. The heuristic explanation of this "negative" result is the following.
• Since the rate function of players is uncoupled with the noise parameter, the speed of the link creation process is unaffected by the level of noise. Looking back at (3.4), we see that as β goes to 0 the link creation process becomes arbitrary fast.
• The link destruction process deletes any edge with the constant rate 6 An extension to different action sets is possible, but does not give more insights in the model. 7 Of course, this is still a potential game.
ξ. This process is pure drift, i.e. it is not depending on the base game, and in particular is independent of the noise level β. In the terminology of stochastic stability calculus, this implies that link destructions are zero cost events. However, it turns out that the rate-ratio λ/ξ determines the number of links the system can carry in the long run.
• The logit choice function of the action adjustment process (3.2) puts equal probability on all actions a loner may choose. However, if a player has at least one neighbor and if β goes to zero, this player will play a best response against the neighbors' behavior with probability arbitrary close to 1.
• Suppose the system is currently in a full coordination state, say the population coordinates on the efficient equilibrium (a 1 , . . . , a 1 ). The network will not be complete in general, but one can derive a distribution over networks, given this action configuration. If there are some loners in the current state, let them switch to a 2 , and give them a link creation opportunity. These steps can be made with zero costs. Now, by definition of the coordination game, an optimal decision in the link creation process is to connect the a 2 players. We are then already in a state where a 1 and a 2 co-exist. At this state no player has an incentive to change his action, so we will not return to the state we were coming from. If there are no loners, we can construct a sequence of link destruction, action adjustment and link creation events, all causing no costs, which leads to a state where two coordination equilibria co-exist, as follows: Destroy the links of player i. Give him an action adjustment opportunity where he chooses a 2 . Since a loner may choose any action with equal probability without making an error, this causes no costs. Do the same thing with player j = i. Then give them a link creation opportunity.
Since i and j are the only agents playing a 2 , an optimal decision in the link creation process is to create the link (i, j). Now we are in a co-existence state and no player has an incentive to change his action.
• In the same vein we can walk through the set
without any costs, in the sense of stochastic stability analysis. As a result, all states contained in this set are stochastically stable.
A similar result, but with admittedly sharper limit predictions, is obtained in the model of Jackson and Watts (2002) . These authors add to the drift term ξ a direction, by assuming that only links where at least one player is better off after the destruction of the link, are very likely to become destroyed. For a fairly large set of parameters (such as linking costs as in Section 7) they also get a co-existence result. However, due to this directionality in the link destruction process, they get sharper limit results in the network dimension under the assumptions that the costs per link are constant. The framework presented in Staudigl (2009b) is sufficiently flexible to capture the model of Jackson and Watts (2002) .
Conclusion
This paper presented a stylized model on the co-evolution of networks and play in the class of potential games. Assumption 2 was crucial to derive a closed-form solution of the unique invariant distribution and to obtain sharp predictions as the noise in the players' decision rules goes to zero. A general selection theorem of potential maximizers applies in this case. Without Assumption 2 the invariant distribution can still be completely characterized, but the model loses its predictive power in the low-noise limit. It seems therefore that some assumptions in this direction are needed if one wants to obtain sharp limiting predictions.
There are many possible routes for extensions. In a companion work (Staudigl, 2009a) I analyze the current model with Assumption 2, but assuming an inverse relationship in the rate function with the size of the population. The intuition is that a larger population should make it less likely that a single agent receives the chance to create a link. In the infinitely large population limit and small positive noise the generated networks do not converge to complete graphs anymore. Hence, nicer asymptotic results are obtained without losing much in analytical power.
A more fundamental question is, however, which class of networks (in the sense of random graph theory) such co-evolutionary models are capable to create. One first step in this direction is the companion work Staudigl (2009b) . There I propose a rather general model of co-evolutionary models with noise, which is rich enough to incorporate the just presented model, as well as the "volatility" models of Ehrhardt et al. (2008b) and Jackson and Watts (2002) . A first result is that such models seem to generate, under fairly mild assumptions on the structure of the random process, so-called inhomogeneous random graphs (see e.g. the nice survey by Newman, 2003) . These models are straightforward extensions of the classical Erdös-Rényi model, where the edge-success probabilities depend on the attributes of the individual vertices. It would be interesting to see how deep this connection indeed is.
A Proofs of Selected Theorems and Propositions
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Uniqueness follows from irreducibility and recurrence of
By construction of the dynamics, we know that changes occur in the process only in one "coordinate": either a single change in the links of the network takes place, or one, and almost surely only one, player switches to another action.
By statistical independence of these two processes we can treat them separately.
Start with a change in the network structure. It suffices to consider the creation of a fresh link. Let ω = (α, g),ω = (α, g ⊕ (i, j)) ∈ Ω. The rate of link creation between players i and j is given by eq. (3.8). The rate with which one returns to the state ω is eq. (3.9). Detailed balance (4.1) demands that
It is easy to see that the measure (4.2) satisfies this condition.
Now consider the event of action adjustment. Let player k be the one who receives such an opportunity and suppose she switches to action a v ∈ A. Let
∈ Ω be the states involved in this transition. The associated rate ratio is
Rewrite the invariant distribution as
Note that the second term on the right-hand side does not depend on player k, and thus the change in the action of this player does have no effect on this term.
Hence, we see that the probability ratio boils down to
Sinceα i = α i for all i = k,α k = a v , and payoffs as well as the indicators g i j are symmetric, we see that
[u(a v , α j ) − u(α k , α j )] (1 − p r|v )
The function f r|v (·) has been defined in the text of the Proposition. There are k! k 1 !···k q ! ways to construct a list (k 1 , . . . , k q ) whose sum equals k. Hence
In each of the products on the right hand side, the factor (1 − p r|v ) n v −δ r,v is a constant and so cancels out after normalization. Hence, define the normalization factor R(I ) = N−1 ∑ k=0 P(κ i = k|I, i ∈ I r ), and call f r,κ (k|I ) := P(κ i = k|I, i ∈ I r ) to get the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. For any ε > 0 consider the set A ε := {ω ∈ Ω|P(ω) < The set A ε can be written as A ε = {ω ∈ Ω|e 
|P |K
> 0 a factor independent of β and ε. For β → 0 the upper bound goes to zero, establishing the result.
